




EUI Working Paper ECO No. 91/34
On Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria 
when Costs are Private Information
SVEND ALBAEK




























































































30001 0 0 0 9 3 8 0 5 2
Please note
As from January 1990 the EUI Working Paper Series is 
divided into six sub-series, each sub-series will be numbered 


























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 91/34
On Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria 
when Costs are Private Information
Sven o  Albaek




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Svend Albaek
Printed in Italy in February 1991 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































On N ash and Stackelberg  Equilibria when C o sts are P riv ate  
In form ation *
Svend Albaek 




The paper discusses a two-period model where unit costs are private information. 
The firms are quantity setters and each firm can only produce in one of the two 
periods. The market clears after period two. If both firms always produce in the 
same period, a Cournot-Nash “situation” arises. If one firm always produces in 
the first period and the other in the second, a Stackelberg situation results. The 
analysis shows that Cournot-Nash can never be a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
of this more general model, while Stackelberg situations can always be supported 
as PBEs. The results are similar if firms are price setters.
JEL 026, 611
*  1 wish to thank Françoise Forges, Otto Keck, Jean-François Mertens and Louis
Phlips for helpful discussions. Financial support from the Danish Social Science 






















































































































































































An often advanced criticism of the well-known Stackelberg leadership model is 
that it provides no endogenous explanation of why one firm is the leader and 
another the follower. It is a simple textbook exercise to check that in a duopoly 
model where the goods are substitutes, the firms quantity setters, and the inverse 
demand functions are linear, both firms prefer being leader to being follower. 
Furthermore, both firms prefer playing Cournot-Nash to being the follower in the 
Stackelberg game. So why should we ever see a  situation where one duopolist 
chooses its quantity after the other? One possible explanation could be to look at 
the historical evolution in the industry. Perhaps a specific firm has dominated for 
decades and tradition has lead other firms to accept its leadership. However 
superficially plausible this explanation may seem in some cases, it is nevertheless 
not satisfying from a theoretical perspective. Simply pointing to history cannot 
answer the question of why the follower accepts the situation today. Other 
factors must be at work. An alternative explanation could be that one firm 
moving first is a way of reaching a semi-cooperative agreement, providing a kind 
of focal point. But then the textbook Stackelberg model is not relevant, since it 
assumes non-cooperative behaviour. Finally, the Stackelberg situation could be 
the outcome of a complicated dynamic game. This is an interesting argument 
which deserves attention. However, in this paper I shall concentrate on a “single­
round” model where each firm only produces once.
The approach in this paper is to analyse a model where both quantity setting 
firms are allowed to choose in which of two periods they will produce. Hence, a 
Stackelberg situation would evolve if the firms in equilibrium produce in 
different periods. A priori, one of several other possibilities is that the firms in 
equilibrium both choose to produce in the same period, and the Cournot-Nash 




























































































can only produce in one of the two periods, and that the market clears after the 
second period. This seems to be the most appropriate avenue to take if one wants 
to take seriously the Stackelberg model. Note, however, that the two periods are 
not necessarily separated by any significant physical time. What is  necessary is 
that a firm producing in the first period makes some irreversible production 
decision which the other firm can observe before making its production decision 
in the second period.
Another distinguishing feature of the model is that the duopolists know their 
own unit cost but not that of the rival firm. Thus, the model is analysed as a 
game of imperfect information, where the unit costs are private information. 
There is then an incentive for high cost firms to defer production until the 
second period in order to hide their weak competitive situation, which would be 
exploited by the rival firm if a high cost firm produced in the first period while 
the rival deferred production. On the other hand, low cost firms would want to 
separate themselves from these high cost firms by producing in the first period. 
The analysis of these conflicting motives of hiding and separating, and of reaping 
the first mover advantage versus reacting optimally to the rival’s action, is the 
focus of this paper.
The main result is that the Stackelberg solution comes out better than the 
Coumot-Nash in this set-up. Since my interpretation of these two concepts is 
slightly unconventional they ought to be explained at this point. In this model a 
Stackelberg situation is one where one firm always produces in the first period, 
no matter its unit cost, while the other firm always produces in the second 
period, no matter its unit cost. In contrast, in a Cournot-Nash situation both 
firms always produce in the same period (be it 1 or 2), no matter their unit 




























































































Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBEs) of this model, while a Cournot-Nash 
situation can never be a PBE. Actually, the statement can be made slightly 
stronger, namely that if one firm always produces in one period, all PBEs have 
the other firm always producing in the other period. This leaves me so far with 
two types of equilibrium, that is, the two Stackelberg situations where each firm 
can either be leader or follower. This, however, is not necessarily the whole story. 
There may be additional sets of PBEs which unfortunately are not very 
tractable. In these types of PBEs some types (identified by unit costs) of each 
firm will produce in period 1 and others in period 2. I give an example of such an 
equilibrium (an “odd” equilibrium) in Section 5.
The next section relates the work in this paper to the existing literature. In 
Section 3 the quantity setting model is described in more detail, and the analysis 
of the equilibria follows in Section 4. Section 5 presents a simple example of an 
equilibrium which is neither of the Nash nor the Stackelberg type, and it is 
shown that this equilibrium does not survive a small change in the parameters of 
the model. Section 6 briefly describes the results from repeating the analysis 
under the alternative assumption that price is the strategic variable. The fined 
section offers some concluding remarks and reflections on directions for further 
research.
2. R elated  L iterature.
The improved game theoretic tools for analysing models with imperfect 
information have recently been applied to a number of two-period oligopoly 





























































































Mailath assumes that one of two duopolists receives a private signal about a 
random demand parameter. The firm with the private information then decides 
whether to engage in simultaneous quantity competition (to play Nash) or to 
make its quantity decision before the other firm (to be a Stackelberg leader). 
Mailath finds that the only equilibrium (after applying an equilibrium 
refinement) has the informed firm moving first, no matter what the observed 
signal is. Thus, his main result, that the firms will never move simultaneously, is 
similar to mine, although in my model the statement is weaker, namely that 
there is no equilibrium where both firms always move at the same time. In an 
“odd” equilibrium the firms may in fact end up producing in the same period. 
Mailath does not allow both firms to receive information and decide on when to 
produce. If I adopted his setting I would also find a single equilbrium, and if 
Mailath adopted mine, I conjecture that his model could also contain an odd 
equilibrium. Due to the additional complications arising from the signalling 
aspects of his model, this equilibrium would probably be extremely difficult to 
analyse.
In Albaek [1990] I pursue a question very similar to the one posed in this paper, 
namely to what extent private cost information can lead to endogenous 
explanations of the distribution of Stackelberg roles. However, in that paper the 
firms decide before they know their own cost whether they will play Stackelberg 
or Nash, and who shall be leader and follower. The main result is that if quantity 
is the strategic variable and cost variances sufficiently different, the firms can 
sometimes agree on such an endogenous distribution of Stackelberg roles. 
However, this is not possible if price is the strategic variable.
Gal-Or [1987] also analyses a Stackelberg game with imperfect information. 




























































































rather on how the introduction of private information about a random demand 
parameter can alter the advantage of being a Stackelberg leader. In contrast to 
Mailath’s model, both quantity setting firms receive private signals. If the leader 
uses a  separating strategy, that is, chooses different quantities for different values 
of its signal, the follower can perfectly infer the leader’s signal through the 
output choice. Hence, the follower can pool the two signals and always base its 
output decision on better information than the leader. Gal-Or shows that this 
informational effect may be sufficiently strong to render the follower’s position 
more favourable than the leader’s, contrary to the perfect information situation.
A common characteristic of the models described so fax is that each duopolist 
can only produce in one of the two periods. In Mailath [1988] and Albaek [1990] 
one or both of the firms can decide in which period to produce, while in Gal-Or 
[1987] the issue of who produces when is an exogenous feature of the model. I will 
now briefly mention two two-period models with private information about costs 
where firms produce in both periods.
In Zachau [1986] two duopolists are uncertain about the rival’s unit cost which 
can take on one of two possible values. A separating equilibrium is one where 
each firm chooses a different first period output level for different unit costs. 
Zachau finds that of many sequential equilibria only a unique separating 
equilibrium survives the strong requirement of stability. In this equilibrium the 
duopolists will try to signal low costs through choosing high first period outputs.
Mailath [1989] lets n firms simultaneously choose prices in each of the two 
periods. Again, each firm knows its own cost, but not the cost of any competitor. 
Although there are also semipooling equilibria, Mailath concentrates on 




























































































all goods axe substitutes, all the first period prices in the signalling equilibrium 
are higher than in a benchmark nonsignalling equilibrium where the costs for 
some reason become common knowledge at the end of the first period.
While the papers discussed above assume some form of asymmetric information, 
there is another strand of recent literature analysing Stackelberg models in full 
information environments. For my purpose the most interesting of these are 
Hamilton and Slutsky [1990], Robson [1990] and Simon [1987], In the section of 
their paper most relevant for my analysis Hamilton and Slutsky extend a model 
of Dowrick [1986]. They show that if attention is restricted to undominated 
strategies in a complete information model similar to mine (although with more 
general payoff functions), then the two Stackelberg equilibria (that is, either firm 
can be the leader) are the only pure strategy equilibria if the basic duopoly game 
has a unique equilibrium in the interior of the action space (Theorem VIII, p. 
43). Hence, their result confirms that the Stackelberg equilibrium tends to 
perform better them (simultaneous) Nash if geunes are extended to model the 
timing decision endogenously. A similar conclusion is reached by Robson [1990], 
who analyses a price-setting duopoly in which the firms can choose and commit 
to a price at any of a countable set of dates before the fixed market-clearing 
date. However, the cost of setting a price is increasing in the difference between 
the price-setting and the market-clearing dates. Robson’s analysis shows that 
“the only subgame perfect equilibria are more reminiscent of Stackelberg than of 
Bertrand” . Simon [1987] is the only paper modelling the timing decision in 
continuous time. The general conclusion carries over to this setting, since he 
finds that in a Stackelberg/Cournot model in continuous time the two firms will 
never choose output simultaneously.




























































































d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [1980] and Robson [1989] ought also to be 
mentioned. d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet call an n-person game Stackelberg- 
solvable if it possesses at least one Stackelberg equilibrium defined as an n-tuple 
of strategies where each player’s strategy is a best choice given that the other (n- 
1) players will play a Nash equilibrium of the remaining game taking the 
“leader’s” strategy as given. Note that this does not correspond to the standard 
definition of a Stackelberg equilibrium in a duopoly; indeed, in a simple Cournot 
model with linear demand there is no Stackelberg equilibrium according to the 
definition of d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet, hence the game is not Stackelberg- 
solvable (d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [1980], Example C, pp. 205-207). 
Robson [1989] extends this work by allowing for explicit timing decisions, that is, 
in order to be a leader, a firm has to choose to move in the first period which, 
however, involves a cost not present in moving in the second period. Robson then 
explores the relationship between the Stackelberg equilibria in the model of 
d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet and subgame perefect equilibria in his own 
extended model. He shows that if an n-tuple of strategies forms a Stackelberg 
equilibrium in the static model, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
extended model which has till firms moving in the second period and playing the 
same strategies as in the static Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, in a two- 
person game where all Nash equilibria of the static game are Stackelberg 
equilibria, all subgame perfect equiibria of the extended game involve a 
Stackelberg equilibrium strategy vector, chosen by both firms in the second 
period.
Finally, a number of recent papers have analysed the attractiveness of the 
different roles in a Stackelberg duopoly in various environments (Ono [1982], 



























































































papers addresses the question of endogenous timing I will not go into the details 
of their analyses.
3. The Model.
The duopolists face two decisions: when to produce and how much to produce. If 
a firm produces in period one, it cannot produce in period two, and vice versa. A 
firm producing in period two can, before making its output decision, observe the 
output of a firm producing in period one. However, if both firms produce in the 
same period, neither of them observes the other’s output before choosing its own. 
The market clears after period two. To keep the analysis tractable, the inverse 
demand function is assumed to be linear in total output,
P =  d -  (q«+q»)
where q» and qt are the outputs of the two firms A and B .1 Note that the 
products of the two firms are assumed to be homogeneous, and that the slope, 
without loss of generality, has been normalized to unity.
The firms know their own costs but are uncertain about the rival’s cost. This 
uncertainty is modelled by assuming each firm to have a subjective probability 
measure over the possible levels of the rival’s costs. To be precise, the production 
technologies are such that unit costs are constant, that is, the total costs of firm i 
is C.jqi) =  c,q,, i =  A, B, where c, is firm i’s unit cost (its “type” ). Hence, there





























































































are no fixed costs. Firm A believes that cb belongs to a closed interval It =  [lt, 
hfe], with 0 <  lt <  ht, and ht finite. The actual value of cb does in fact belong to 
this interval. Furthermore, for technical reasons, I assume that d +  1, — 2hj >  0; 
i, j =  A, B; i ^  j .2 The prior beliefs of A about B ’s unit cost is described by the 
probability space (I4, B t, /ib) where B s is the Borel tr-algebra on Ik and fib a 
probability measure. The assumptions on B ’s prior beliefs about A ’s unit cost are 
defined in a similar way and summarized by the probability space (L , Bo, fia) 
where the measure is independent of pt. Note that the subscript a refers to B ’s 
prior beliefs about A ’s cost and vice versa. The two probability spaces are 
common knowledge, a standard assumption in this type of model.
The model is solved by deriving a plan for what firm B (and correspondingly 
firm A) would do for each value of cb in I4, although it of course already knows 
its own cost. A strategy for player B is therefore a quadruple of measurable 
functions, <r, =  (8,, qj, q(” , q ^ ) where 6b: I4 —> [0, 1] gives the probability that 
firm B with cost cb will produce in the first period; q(: lb R+ is the quantity, 
as a function of cb, it will produce in period one if it decides to produce in that 
period. If it instead decides to produce in period two, there are two possibilities: 
ql": Is —» R+ is, again as a function of c4, the quantity firm B will produce in 
period 2, if firm A also produces in period 2 (n is for “Nash” ); and finally q ^ : I4 
x R+ -> R+ gives as a function of cb and qa the quantity firm B will produce in 
the second period when A has produced in the first period (f for “follower” ).3
In the specification above I have not allowed for mixed strategies over quantities,
2 This assumption ensures that quantities always are strictly positive.
3 The word “strategy” may at times be used not only for <ra and ab, but also




























































































only over the decision on when to produce. The use of mixed strategies when 
there is an uncountable number of types poses some technical problems (see 
Aumann [1964], Milgrom and Weber [1985]) which there seems to be no reason 
to introduce here.
The profit to firm A with unit cost c« from producing q„ units of output when 
firm B produces qj is Tn(qs,q(;ca) =  (d—q0—q j—Co)q0. The firms are risk neutral, 
and no side payments are allowed. Furthermore, there is no discounting between 
the two periods. Hence each firm maximizes its individual expected profit. Given 
a strategy profile (<r„, <rt) the expected profit to firm A with marginal cost c« is
Po(vo,ffi;co) — j j  ea(ca)fll(cj)Ir«(qi(c„),q](ct);c0)d^i 
+  | I^a(ca)[l-91(cl)]jro(qì(c«),qj/ (c>,q0);c0)d^l
+ IJl-9a(ca)]9i(ci)ir«(q«/ (c«,ql ),qJ(ct);c«)d/iJ
+  | j j T ^ o ( c « ) ] [ l_^»(C i)]»rii(q»"(ca),q t (c j) ;C o )d jis
At severed points in the paper firm A will be assumed always to produce in one 
of the two periods, while some types of firm B with positive probability produce 
in period 1 and some in period 2. The firm B types who produce in period 1 are 
then identified by a measure i/J and those who produce in period 2 by v*. 
Consistency requires that i'J(C) +  "i(C ) =  /q(C) for all C e B t. Furthermore, if 
a proposed strategy for firm B is a b — (06, qj, q j", q ^ ) then




























































































•'J(C) =  f c [1_9(c‘ )]d'1‘ for ^  C e B ‘
Define the mass of firm B types who produce in period i by
m * = i =  1, 2
where, naturally, m] +  m4 =  1.
The average unit cost of each of the two firms is
C; =  JjC .dp, i =  A, B
If m[ >  0, the conditional average unit cost for the firm B types who produce in 
period i is
i _  f ctdid 
c» — 1 , J 1» mk
i =  1, 2
Obviously, for consistency, it must be true that c4 =  rnjcj +  m4c4
4. Equilibria.
The equilibrium notion employed in this paper is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
(PBE). Readers interested in a general definition, and related concepts such as 
Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium, may consult 
Fudenberg and Tirole [1989]. It should be noted that all these equilibrium 
concepts formally are defined for finite games, while the firms in this model have 





























































































In the present model a strategy profile <rt) is part of a Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium if
(i) Pi(ffj,<Tj;Cj) >  Pifir^oyjCi) for all c, and i j  =  A, B; i j 4
(ii) q ^ c ^ q ,)  e argmax x.-fq^q^Cj) for all c,- and q̂ -; i j  =  A, B; i ^  j
q;>°
(iii) there exists a probability measure Vq defined over the measurable 
space (1 ,̂ B j) such that
q?”(Ci) 6 argmax U ffi(q,,qjn(cj );ci)d^ - for all c*; i j  =  A, B; i jt j 
q<>o J i
Condition (i) states that the strategy profile has to be a Nash equilibrium, while 
(ii) ensures that a “follower” will always choose the quantity which maximizes 
its profit. The third condition says that the quantity choice in a second period 
Nash-like situation can be rationalized by some belief ipj over which types of the 
rival would wait and produce in the second period. Of course, given a particular 
strategy profile, one or both of the conditions (ii) and (iii) may be implied by (i). 
However, for some strategy profiles certain events may happen with zero 
probability. In those situations conditions (ii) and (iii) guarantee that responses 
to out-of-equilibrium behaviour are rational.
4 “For all c. and < 7 means “for all c. € i. and all a\ € where li, is the set




























































































Note that no belief-measure about a leader’s cost is specified in condition (ii). A 
follower cares only about the quantity choice of the leader. The rival’s cost 
matters only to a  firm in so fax that it indicates something about the quantity 
choice the rival wil make. When the leader has already chosen its output level 
the follower simply maximizes profit taking the leader’s output as given. What 
marginal cost the leader has is in this situation of no interest to the follower.
This also means that signalling questions do not arise in this model, as it would 
if the asymmetric information was about a common value parameter. For 
instance, Mailath [1988] analyses signalling equilibria in a similar model where 
the information is about the strength of demand. Another example would be if 
the costs of the two firms were correlated and the firms do not know their own 
cost perfectly. Then a  first mover would have an incentive to try to persuade the 
second mover that costs are higher than they in fact are. Signalling issues would 
also arise if the firms could produce in both periods. Then a firm would in the 
first period try to signal that it has a low cost in order to make the rival restrain 
its output in the second period. As a consequence of the above arguments there 
are in the present model no pooling equilibria in quantity choices: different cost 
types always choose different output levels. The only “pooling” going on is that 
types with different costs may produce in the same period and hence cannot be 
distinguished by the rival before the output levels are chosen (unless, of course, a 
firm is a leader).
In full, the equilibrium concept specifies a strategy profile and beliefs at each 
information set. These beliefs may implicitly be defined from the strategy profile 
via Bayes’ rule. In this model the only interesting case with beliefs not specified 
by Bayes’ rule is when one of the firms always produces in period one. Then the 




























































































some belief as required by condition (iii). In the following the word “equilibrium” 
means a strategy profile and associated beliefs, although for expositional ease 
these beliefs will not be specified explicitly when they can be deduced from the 
strategy profile.
This section focuses on the possible types of equilibrium in the quantity game. 
The analysis proceeds through two propositions stating what can not be 
equilibria.
Proposition  1. There is no Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which OjfcJ =  1 
for all c, e /, and. 0j(Cj) >  0 for some Cj e Ijt i #  j.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The intuition behind this result is very simple. Imagine firm A always produces 
in period l .5 Suppose there is an equilibrium where some firm B type with 
positive probability also produces in period 1. Then this B type will in general be 
on its mean, but not its exact, reaction function, since it does not know the exact 
quantity A will produce. However, by deviating to period 2 our B type would 
observe A’s output and hence be on its exact reaction function. Proposition 1 
thus simply states that it is always better to be on the exact, rather than the 
mean, reaction function.
Note that Proposition 1 says there can be no equilibrium where both firms 
always produce in period 1. If a situation where both firms always produce in the 
same period is interpreted as a Cournot-Nash solution for this model, Proposition






























































































1 shows that no such solution can exist in the first period. The next proposition 
rules out such a situation in the second period as well.
Proposition  2. There is no Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which 6 i(c J  =  0 
for all c, 6 /, and Ojfcj) <  1 for some c1 e Ij, i =£ j .
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Again, the intuition is quite straightforward. Imagine now that firm A always 
produces in period 2. If a subset of It produces in period 2 with a positive 
probability, A will, using Bayes’ rule, form a belief about who it is playing 
against. Due to the linearity of the inverse demand function, all A really cares 
about is the average unit cost, say c l . of the B  types who produce in period 2. 
Some of these types will have costs lower than cl, but will be treated as if their 
cost were Cj. By deviating to period 1 these types reveal their stronger 
competitive situation, and simultaneously reap the first mover advantage a 
leader has when quantity is the strategic variable and goods are substitutes. 
Clearly, the proposition must be true.
Proposition 2 shows that a Cournot-Nash like situation in the second period 
cannot be a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Indeed, Propositions 1 and 2 together 
show that, in this model, there is no PBE where both firms always produce in 
the same period.
Two possible types of equilibrium remain. One can be thought of as a kind of 
Stackelberg equilibrium, where one firm (the leader) always produces in period 1 
while the other (the follower) always produces in period 2. The other possibility 




























































































period and some in the second. While in general both types of equilibrium may 
exist, I shall concentrate on the Stackelberg equilibria. However, in the next 
section I will briefly discuss an “odd” equilibrium.
Proposition  3. There always exist Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which 9 j(c J =  
0 for all ci 6 7, and 6j (c,) =  i  for all ci € /, , i ^  j.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. The firm which in equilibrium is 
supposed always to produce in period two (say, firm B) will never deviate since 
the other firm’s (A’s) output decision is not changed by the deviation, and being 
on the exact reaction function is always better than being on the mean. I then 
concentrate on the belief used by firm B if it unexpectedly finds itself called 
upon to play Bayesian-Nash in period two rather than being the Stackelberg 
follower. If I can find a belief which keeps all A types from deviating, I have 
proved the proposition. Now, for an A type considering a deviation the worst B 
can think is that A for sure has cost h0, since B then will behave aggressively 
and drive down the price. In this case, it is easy to show that the higher the c0, 
the higher the temptation to deviate since there is a larger gain to be had from 
hiding one’s cost. Thus firm ha has the most to gain from deviating. However, if 
B thinks for sure that it is playing against ha, then ha will simply be switching 
from being a Stackelberg leader to playing Nash, which can never be a profitable 
move. But if deviating is not profitable for ha it is not profitable for any Ca <  ha. 
Hence, I have found a belief which supports the Stackelberg situation as a PBE. 
Since the choice of A as leader was arbitrary, the converse Stackelberg situation 




























































































Note that the proposition only describes the equilibrium path, not the 
equilibrium itself, since the associated beliefs are not specified. In fact, each of 
the two Stackelberg outcomes can be supported by any belief belonging to a 
connected set in the space of possible beliefs: all beliefs which generate a 
sufficiently high marginal cost will do.6
As mentioned above, there may be more than the two sets of equilibria already 
found. These additional equilibria would be characterized by some types of each 
firm producing in the first period and others in the second, perhaps even with 
some types using mixed strategies to determine when to produce. While it is 
relatively easy to construct examples in which such equilibria exist, it has so far 
proved difficult to solve for them, or just determine some qualitative features, in 
the general model. Since the primary focus of the paper is contrasting the merits 
of the Cournot-Nash and the Stackelberg solutions within this more general 
framework, I have decided to proceed without a full analysis of all the model’s 
equilibria. However, in the next section I present a simple example of an 
equilibrium which is neither of the Nash nor the Stackelberg type.
5. A Sim ple E xam ple.
Assume that the marginal cost of each of the two firms only can take on two 
values. With probability 0.5, c, =  1 and with probability 0.5, c,- =  h, i =  A, B. 
Suppose a firm with probability 1 produces in period 1 if it has a low marginal 
cost, and with probablity 1 in period 2 if the marginal cost is high. Framed in
6 Kohlberg and Mertens [1986] make extensive use of the concept of a




























































































the language of Section 2 , 0,(1) — 1 and 0,(h) =  0, i — A, B. In this section I 
calculate the expected profits from timing production in this way, using the 
associated optimal quantity strategies. I then show that this is an equilibrium for 
some parameter values, but not for others.
The expected profit to a low cost firm from this situation is (calculations are 
shown in Appendix 2)
P(l) =  &  [3d+h-41]2
while the expected profit to a high cost firm is
P(h) =  *  [5d-9h+41]2 +  f8 [d-h]2
By deviating to period 2, and making the optimal output choices, the low cost 
firm would alternatively have expected profits of
P'(l) =  f 2 [2d+h-31]2 +  jh  [5d-h-41]2
Similarly, the maximal expected profits to a high cost firm from deviating to 
period 1 is
P '(h )=  76g [9d 13h+41]2
Suppose the parameters have the specific values d =  120, 1 =  10, and h =  20. 
Then P(l) =  1355, P(h) =  969, P'(l) =  1304, and P'(h) =  963. Since P(l) > P'(l) 
and P(h) >  P'(h), the strategies form an equilibrium.7 It is obvious that the low
7 That is, the timing functions 0,(c,) given above, and the associated quantity 




























































































cost leader will not want to deviate. Since the cost difference is big, there is a 
large benefit to the high cost follower of knowing exactly which type it is playing 
against, and it will forego the first mover advantage to get this information. 
Hence, this example has shown that there can be equilibria of other types than 
the ones discussed in the previous section.
Now, change the value of h to 12. Then P(l) =  1292, P(h) =  1201, P'(l) =  1271, 
P'(h) =  1210. In this case the high cost firm will deviate to period 1, and the 
situation is not an equilibrium. Since the high and low cost firms are so similar, 
the value to the high cost firm of knowing which type it is playing against is 
small, while it will gain substantially if it ends up being a leader to a high cost 
follower.
This section has given a simple example of a model in which there is at least one 
more equilibrium than the two Stackelberg equilibria, which the analysis in 
Section 3 showed will always exist.8 However, it was also shown that a  change in 
the value of one of the parameters made the equilibrium disappear. This means 
that there is no hope of a general proposition stating that there always exists 
“odd” equilibria in which low cost firms produce in the first period and high cost 
firms in the second. I have not yet been able to find a general way of 
determining when these additional equilibria do exist and what they look like. At 
the moment this question is left for future research.
8 I do not state these equilibria here, as they can easily be found from the 




























































































6. Price as S trateg ic V ariable.
It is a straightforward exercise to repeat the preceding analysis under the 
alternative assumption that price is the strategic variable.9 If both firms always 
produce in the same period a Bertrand-Nash situation would arise while a 
Stackelberg situation would result if they, always produce in separate periods. As 
was the case for the model with quantity as strategic variable, Bertrand-Nash 
situations can never be Perfect Bayesian Equilibria while Stackelberg situations 
can always be supported by PBEs.
There are some fundamental strategic differences between quantity and price 
competition with complete information. First, under quantity competition the 
leader’s position brings greater profit to a firm than the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, which again is better than the follower’s position (assuming that the 
rival has the same cost in each of the three situations). Under price competition 
the follower’s position is preferred to the leader’s, which again is preferred to the 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Second, under quantity competition the higher the 
rival’s cost the higher one’s quantity will be. Since reaction functions axe 
downwards sloping high cost firms will in incomplete information situations want 
to pretend to be low cost firms, while low cost firms will want to separate 
themselves from high cost firms. Under price competition, the higher the rival’s 
cost the higher one’s price, and since reaction functions are upwards sloping it is 
now the low cost firms who will hide, and the high cost firms who will want to 
separate themselves. While one initially may think these differences could change 
the results of the preceding analysis since the strategic environment is changed,
9 Of course the products would have to be less than perfect substitutes for the




























































































this turns out not to be the case. In the following paragraphs some heuristic 
arguments for this result are presented while rigorous proofs are left to the 
reader.
A Bertrand Nasi: situation in the first period cannot be a PBE by the same 
argument that applied in Section 4. It is always preferable to be on the exact, 
rather than the mean reaction curve. Hence all types of both firms would have 
an incentive to deviate from this arrangement. A Bertrand-Nash situation in the 
second period would be broken by high cost types since they can reveal that they 
indeed are of high cost by deviating to period one, and at the same time position 
themselves as leader, which is at least as good as playing Bert rand-Nash.
The Stackelberg situations can be supported as PBEs in almost the same way as 
in Section 4. However, now the worst a follower can think about a deviating 
leader’s cost is that it is the lowest possible. Hence, if the follower holds a belief 
with a sufficiently low mean, all leader types will be deterred from deviating. 
And, since obviously no follower type would want to deviate, the Stackelberg 
situation can be sustained as a PBE. However, as in Section 4, there may be 
additional PBEs of a more complicated nature which will not be discussed here.
7. Conclusion.
The paper has shown that if one, in an imperfect information model, tries to 
model both when two firms will make their strategic decision (quantity or price) 
and what the value of that decision variable will be, then the familiar one-period 
(Bayesian) Cournot-Nash and Bertrand-Nash equilibria cannot be rationalized as 




























































































Stackelberg model, which in this context could be interpreted as a situation 
where one firm always produces in period one and the other in period two, can 
always be supported as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the two-period model.
These results underline the problems of concentrating on simultaneous-choice 
models in a world where most choices probably are made in what would be most 
accurately described by continuous time models. Modelling this explicitly may 
prove very difficult.10 This paper has at least shown that using simple two-period 
models can give drastically different results from the one-period simultaneous- 
choice model. Thus careful examination of the particular market to be analysed 
is necessary before choosing the appropriate model. One important consideration 
is then to what extent a “follower” can observe a “leader’s” choice. If there is no 
way a leader can make its choice observable (or maybe just make it clear that a 
choice has been made), the Stackelberg model of course loses its attraction.
The analysis has given some indication of half an answer to a question posed in 
the introduction. The question is: why should a firm accept being follower in the 
quantity game when the follower’s position yields less profit than even the 
Cournot-Nash situation? The half-answer is: because the Stackelberg situation is 
an equilibrium while the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not. This is only a half- 
answer, because it does not determine how firms decide who should be the leader 
and who should be the follower. Or, in other words, how do firms choose between 
the two sets of equilibria that were discussed above, that is, the two converse 
Stackelberg configurations? Although a general study of this problem for the
10 Simon [1987] has, as an example of a. more general theory, analysed a 
Stackelberg/Cournot model without uncertainty in continuous time. His efforts show 




























































































moment is left for future research, the analysis in Albaek [1990] points to some 
situations where the solution is fairly obvious: one of the two Stackelberg 
configurations may Pareto dominate the other, in which case it seems reasonable 




























































































A ppendix 1: P roof of Propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Assume firm A always produces in the first period. From the definition of a 
PBE, clearly
n2f(r n \ _  d _ 3 f _ £ $fit 2  2  2
Then firm A with unit cost c« will find qi as
qi(ca) € argmax < L  [d -q fl-q J(c6)-Ca]qadi/J +  
q0>o Lb
J It [d -  q« -  qV (c, ,qa ) -  c.]q«di/J j
The first order condition of this problem is
(d -2q „—c»)mî -  j^ q jfo jd i/i  +  ($ i- q „ - c « + ^ )m j =  0
(Al) n 1 _ U _  t-fl
2 2mj+m i
j i
2m l+m , 2m J+m j
To find qj, solve
qj 6 argmax f [d - q i(c a )-q j- c 6]qsd̂ <. 
qfc>0 J la





























































































From (A l) and (A2), qi(c«) and qj(ct) are affine in c« and cit say 
(A3) qa(Ca) — Ola — 0aCa
(A4) q»(c») =  “ 6 — Pbcb




Talcing expectations over (A3) and (A4) yields
f qi(ca)dpa =  o« -  -— — 2
Jw Znij -f- m ̂
-  j )
Using this and (A l) and (A2) to solve for a« and a b in (A3) and (A4) leads to
a =  d , ct+m^(ct- c 0)
(2+m J) (2+m J)(l+m J)





























































































The expected profit to firm B with unit cost c6 if it produces in period 1 is then
r r f t ( c ^ a ( c « ) ( c ^ ) [ d  (tta /?oCo) d/Jo
J la
/  (l+m j)d ca-lci, _  c_j
\  2(l+m J) 2+mJ 2
If the same firm produces in period 2 its expected profit is
j j  ’rj(qi(ca),q»/ (cl );ci)d/i»
f / j  / „  \  d  — (oca — l3 o C a ) — Cb \ f d  — ( t t a  — / ? a C a )  — Cb\ A
=  I (d-(a«-j0«C a)----- ----- 2---- ------- Cb)\--------- 2---------
2
r f (l+m j)d _  |c t mfco Co _ cs\ ,
Jlo \2(2+m J) 2+mJ 2(2+mJ)(l+m J) 2(l + mJ) 2 J
( (l+ m j)d  c « - fe t c ,\  , Vo
\2 (2+ mi) 2+mi 2 )  2(l+m J)
where
V a  —  J j  ^ C a — C o ^  d/ia
Since Vo >  0, j j  »,(qi(c.),q{(ct);c,)d#i, >  J j  iri(qi(co),qj/ (c,„qo);cl )d/io for all 
ct e 1». Hence, 0t(cb) =  0 for all cb e I6, or, in words, no firm B type will ever 
produce in period 1 with positive probability if firm A always produces in period 






























































































Proof of Proposition 2.
Assume now that firm A always produces in the second period. Clearly,
* W )  =  i - ï - t
Firm B with unit cost Cj will then find qj(ct) as
q\(cb) e argmax [d-qV  {ca,qb) - q b- c b\qbdfia
qfc>o Jla
The first order condition gives
q»(cj) = d I C a r2 +  2 ~  C "
which means that
^ _ d i C a C a
q“ _ 4 + 2 _ T _ 2
The expected profit to firm B with unit cost ck from producing in period 1 is 
therefore
j j  T4(q«/ (c«,q6),qHc»);cs)dpa
(A5) l l i d
d — Ca~i~2c b—2c a d  +  Ca — Cb \ / d  +  Ca—2c (
d̂ + c » - 2 ct^ d + c o - 2 ctj




























































































the first order conditions for expected profit maximizing output choices in period 
2 for firm A and firm B with unit costs c<> and cb are
(A6 ) = Ì  -  1 fT s £ i® * )d -  §■
Jfi m 62 21
(A7) fit =  2  -  2 J l  ~  ^
Clearly, the strategies are affine in own costs, say
(A8 ) ql"(c<.) = è aC a
(A9) qj"(c») =  It -  6tcb
Comparing (A6 ), (A7), (A8 ) and (A9) immediately gives
6 a  — 6 b —  ^
Taking expectations over (A8 ) and (A9) yields
(LqJ-(c)d,u = l a  -  i  
J Itq?"(c4)dn 2 =  ml ( i b -  | 2)
Using this and (A6 ) and (A7) to solve for 7 0  and yb in (A8 ) and (A9) leads to
-  d , £5 _  Ca




























































































76 + Ç a3
Then the expected profit to firm B with cost cb from producing in period 2 is
(A10)
=  j j  [d-(7»-'5°c«)-(7&-6sC4) - c t][7 j-« 4Cj]d/j<,
In order to compare (A5) and (AIO) it is useful to introduce two easily checked 
extra profit expressions. If firm B with cost c4 is a  Stackelberg leader against a 
follower with cost c« for certain, the profit to firm B is
*i(e.,c,) =  (d+ Y 2c>)(d+ Y 2c»)
If the same two firms played Cournot-Nash, the profit to firm B would be
nb (Co,C4) ^a+C o—2ct j 2
Since a Stackelberg leader can always choose the Cournot-Nash outcome,
j j  (c.,q»)>qi(c»);c»)d/*« =  ir4(ca,c4) > x"(co,c4)
Now consider firm B with cost c4 <  c2. Then - ^  <  , and therefore




























































































Hence, for all ck <  cjj,
| L I>’k(q«/ (c«,q»),qi(cl);cj)d/j<, >  j I/ » ( q ° n(c«)>q»"(c»);ci)d'i“
and all these types will therefore deviate to period 1. Clearly, for any suggested 
equilibrium, where is not concentrated at a single ct, all types with c6 <  m,! 
would rather produce in period 1. If is concentrated at a single point, say cj, 
then firm A will know for certain that it is playing against cj in the second 
period. But then firm B with cost cj, will obviously prefer to be the leader instead 
of playing Nash in period 2. This breaks the suggested equilibrium. Since the 
choice of A as the period 2 producer was arbitrary, the proposition is proved.
0
Proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose firm A is the leader and B the follower. The proposed equilibrium 
strategies of the two firms are easily found from the preceding analysis as
qa(ca) =  ^ +  ~2 ~  Ca 
n2,(r „  \ _  d Sf 2 »
q» ics> q»i — 2 2 -  2
No B type will ever deviate, since firm A’s output decision is not changed by B ’s 
deviation, and being on the exact reaction function is always better than being 
on the mean. (See proof of Proposition 1 for a rigorous argument.)




























































































J Is7ra(qi(c0),q t/ (ct ,q„);c0)d/ii =  ^d + c^  2!r?^ d +  c>2 - c° )
A deviation to period 2 by an A type is a zero probability event. Hence, Bayes’ 
rule poses no restriction on the beliefs of firm B about which A type (in L )  has 
deviated. Let this belief be summarized by the probability measure i/>a. The 
average ca according to is
Cad^a
la
From the proof of Proposition 2 it is easily seen that the period 2 strategies if 




and from (A10) the expected profit to firm A with cost ca from deviating to 
period 2  is
jl îr<>(qa'‘ (c i>),qjn(ci);c<,)d/jj — (3 + "jj ~ ~ v?)
Denote now by Ta(ca,Ca) the temptation to deviate from period 1 period 2 for 
firm A with cost ca, when firm B ’s belief specifies an average marginal cost of c t.
Ta(c#,Ca ) =  | j  Xa(qa’‘ (ca),qtn(c6);Cfl)d/it ”  J j  X a ( q a ( C a ) , q j , q a);Ca)dfia 
— fd , Çj çt  Cat2 / d +  Ct —2cat/'d +  ct —2cq’\




























































































I need to show that there exists a belief such that Ta(ca,c<f) < 0 for all Ca e 
Io. Now, concentrate the belief on ha (such that i t  =  h a). Differentiating T a with 
respect to Ca gives
dTa(ea,ha) =  1 (d +  £, +  ha -  3ca) >  Q for all Ca € la
dca 6 V '
where the inequality follows from the assumption that d +  ls — 2ha >  0. Now, 
Ta(ha,ha) is the difference between the profit to a firm with cost ha playing 
Cournot-Nash against a firm with cb and the profit to the same A firm from 
being Stackelberg leader against firm cs. Clearly, Ta(ha,ha) must be non-positive, 
that is Ta(ha,ho) < 0. Since dTa(Ca,ha)/dCa <  0, Ta(ca,ha) <  0 for all Ca <  ha. 
Hence, there will always exist a belief tpa such that no A type will deviate to 
period two, and the PBE holds. Since A was chosen arbitrarily as leader, there is 





























































































Appendix 2: Profit Expressions in Section 5.
The follower strategy is found directly from the first order condition of 
max[120—q ,—q j—c.-jq,-. Hence, q?/ (ci,qJ) =  d -  lq ; — |c,-. A low cost firm will 
with probability 0.5 produce simultaneously in period 1 with another low cost 
firm, and with probability 0.5 have a high cost follower reacting to its output. 
Hence, a low cost firm will solve
max I [d—q,—q‘ (l)—1] q, +  \ [ d - q ,- q - '(h ,^ )- !]  q,
Inserting the follower’s reaction to qi5 the first order condition gives the following 
reaction function for the low cost firm:
q}(i) =  id -  iqj(i) + i t  -  §i
Firm j has a similar reaction function, and the equilibrium strategies can be 
solved to be
q.-(i) =  Id +  ih -  il
The output of a high cost firm acting as a follower to this output is then
q fth ) =  id -  iq}(l) -  ih 
=  Ad -  fth + 11
I also need to find the equilibrium strategies if two high cost firms are facing 





























































































q?’ 00 =  ^  -  &
The expected profit to a low cost firm in the proposed equilibrium is then 
P(l) =  J [d - Jd - ih + Jl- id - J+ J l-1 ]  [|d + |h -il]
+ J [d - |d - *h + |l- *d + f th - J l- l )  Bd+Jh-Jl]
=  [ftd + *h -|l] Bd+ih-Jl]
=  256 [3d+h-4l]2
Similarly, the expected profit to a high cost firm is
P(h) =  J [d -ftd + fth - il- ld - Jh + il-h ] fod-fth+Jl]
+  i [d - id + ih -id + ih -h ] [jd-jh]
=  [ftd-^h+il]2 +  i [Jd-ih]2 
=  ih [5d-9h+41]2 +  f8 [d-h]2
Notice that in the proposed equilibrium Bayes’ rule yields beliefs for all 
information sets. Hence, there is no need for specifying out-of-equilibrium beliefs. 
To check whether the strategies form an equilibrium I must calculate the profits 
from a (best) deviation for both high and low cost firms.




























































































another low cost firm it will choose output q?/ (l,qy(l)) =  id — |ql(l) —p  =  j|d  — 
j^h — Jl. With equal probability it will find itself playing against a  high cost 
firm, which thinks that its opponent also is has high cost. Then the deviating low 
cost firm will solve max [d—q, —q^” (h) —1] q*. The solution is q,- =  Id — §q2"(h) 
_ 11 = Id + lh -  112A 3U ' 6U 2a‘
The expected profit from this deviation, is then
P'd) =  ! [d -^ d + fe+ P —Id - lh + P —1] [f6d - f6h -p]
+ 1 [d - ld - lh + p - ld + lh - l]  [Id+lh-p]
=  H f .d - A t - P ] 2 +  i l id + ih - W *
=  [5d—h—41]2 +  fs [2d+h-31]2
Finally, a high cost firm deviating to produce in period 1 instead of period 2 will 
with probability 0.5 face a low cost opponent in period 1 and with probability 0.5 
have a high cost firm following in period 2. Hence, it ’s problem for deciding the 
optimal deviation is
max 1 [d—q ,- f d —ih + p —h] q( +  1 [ d - q ,-  q f(h , q ,)-h ] q, 
Inserting the reaction function q^(h,q,) and solving for q, gives q, =  jjd +  p  —






























































































i [d - |d -ii+ « h -|d -ih + ii-h ] gd+ji-Hh] 
i [d -jd -ii+ H h -(id -fid -A i+ah -ih )-h ] Bd+ii-Hh] 
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